The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). Members of the GP made a commitment upon joining to provide a specified amount of assistance to selected countries over the course of ten years to counter the threat of WMD proliferation.  Should a GP member want to devote some of that assistance to efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, NSOI provides it a menu of cooperative projects from which to choose.  Although Russia and Ukraine are the only officially designated recipients of GP assistance, the U.S. and several other GP members claim credit against their GP commitment for relevant assistance provided to any former Soviet state, and the U.S. government encourages all GP members to do so.  Thus, a contribution to any NSOI project in a former Soviet state would count against that member’s overall financial commitment to the GP.  Furthermore, if the GP agrees to expand to a worldwide scope, any NSOI project in any partner state would count against a member’s commitment.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  The GICNT aims to enhance cooperation between and build the capacity of all willing partner nations to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism.  Members of the GICNT adhere to a set of principles in joining the initiative.  Embedded in these principles is the concept of assistance to those in need to improve their abilities to counter the WMD terrorism threat. NSOI-developed projects provide GICNT members a means to implement that concept.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.  In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, establishing for the first time binding obligations on all UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials.  All states have three primary obligations under UNSCR 1540 relating to such items: to prohibit support to non-State actors seeking such items; to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items to non-State actors, and prohibiting assisting or financing of such proliferation; and to take and enforce effective measures to control these items, in order to prevent their proliferation, as well as to control the provision of funds and services that contribute to proliferation.  While each member state is responsible for implementing the provisions of UNSCR 1540, the resolution encourages States in a position to do so to offer assistance to other States to help them implement the resolution.  NSOI-developed projects offer potential donor states opportunities to help priority states build their capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling and better implement UNSCR 1540.

The Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program.  The Department of Energy’s SLD program is authorized to accept funds from other countries or sources to complement its efforts to improve monitoring capabilities at borders and other points of entry.  NSOI works closely with SLD to determine where such complementary assistance is most needed in the countries that NSOI engages, and this determination is reflected in the cooperative projects that NSOI develops.  Donors wishing to partner with SLD in the engaged countries can do so by working through the NSOI team.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).  The Department of Energy’s GTRI program is also authorized to accept funds from other countries or sources to complement its efforts to enhance the security of nuclear and radioactive materials.  As with SLD, NSOI works closely with GTRI to determine where such complementary assistance is most needed in the countries that NSOI engages, and this determination is reflected in the cooperative projects that NSOI develops.  Donors wishing to partner with GTRI in the engaged countries can do so by working through the NSOI team.

The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program.  The Department of State’s EXBS program is also authorized to accept funds from other countries or sources to complement its efforts to enhance export control systems and improve monitoring capabilities at fixed points of entry and along green borders.  As with the Department of Energy programs described above, NSOI works closely with the EXBS program to determine where such complementary assistance is most needed in the countries that NSOI engages, and this determination is reflected in the cooperative projects that NSOI develops.  Donors wishing to partner with EXBS in the engaged countries can do so by working through the NSOI team.

Other U.S. Anti-Nuclear Smuggling Assistance Programs.  There are numerous other U.S. programs that provide assistance to enhance anti-smuggling capabilities. None of these programs is authorized to accept funds from non-U.S. sources.  However, NSOI works closely with these programs to account for their ongoing assistance in determining where additional assistance is needed in the engaged countries and how that assistance can be most effectively coordinated with the current efforts.