

**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
Project #1. Strengthening Georgia’s Nuclear Regulatory Agency

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To improve control of radioactive material in Georgia through strengthening of Georgia’s nuclear regulatory agency.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Nuclear and Radioactive Safety Service (NRSS) of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and National Resources (MEPNR)
<b>Need</b>	The NRSS has substantially strengthened Georgia’s nuclear regulatory system in the past several years, with significant support from the international community. The NRSS created a registry of radioactive sources, drafted new laws to bring its regulatory system in line with IAEA guidance, expanded its office in Tbilisi, and opened a new office in western Georgia (Poti). Despite significant progress, the NRSS still lacks adequate equipment and training to fully control radioactive sources and implement all relevant IAEA guidance. In particular, the NRSS lacks sufficient dosimeters and protective equipment to inspect potentially hazardous areas and safely transport radioactive materials. Additional training on international best practices for transporting radioactive materials is also needed.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The United States provided equipment and training for additional staff at the NRSS office in Tbilisi.</li> <li>• The United States and Sweden helped the NRSS establish a regional office in Poti.</li> <li>• The NRSS still needs additional dosimeters, personal protective equipment, and training on transporting radioactive materials.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the short term, all staff trained and equipped and a regional presence established for the NRSS in western Georgia.</li> <li>• In the long term, improved capacity for NRSS to conduct inspections regularly of facilities possessing radioactive materials throughout Georgia, to enforce appropriate physical security and safeguards regulations, to transport radioactive materials safely and securely, and to conduct internal reviews to improve its regulatory infrastructure in line with IAEA guidance.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	This project is funded by the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden, but additional donors may be needed. The United States has provided assistance to develop the registry, revise laws, expand the Tbilisi office, develop the regional office, and provide vehicles and specialized containers to the NRSS. The UK provided additional containers and funded a feasibility study to help the NRSS develop a long-term waste management strategy. Sweden is supporting the salaries of the staff at the Poti office for a limited period. The United States will provide additional training on transportation security, and likely will provide some additional dosimeters and protective equipment.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
**Project #2. Increased Patrolling of Green Borders**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To increase patrolling of areas between established points of entry to detect illicit trafficking through these areas.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Georgian Border Police (GBP)
<b>Need</b>	Many of the green borders (areas between established points of entry) have little or no security, which presents a significant vulnerability that could be exploited by smugglers. The mountainous terrain in many parts of Georgia makes patrolling these areas a particular challenge. The U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), Georgian Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) Assistance Program, Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program, and Second Line of Defense (SLD) program have provided training and equipment to help the Border Police conduct regular patrols along the green border, but these patrols remain limited. As the Georgian economy and state budget have grown, the GBP has received additional funding for patrolling the country's green borders, but funding from indigenous and international sources remains inadequate.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide additional radiation detection equipment, thermal imaging cameras, portable outposts to provide a base of operations in remote regions, and other equipment and training to help the GBP better patrol these areas.</li> <li>• Coordinate closely with existing U.S. and international assistance providers and the GBP in determining specific needs for specific areas.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular, sustained patrolling of green border areas.</li> <li>• Increased interdiction of smuggling along the green borders.</li> <li>• Cross-border traffic forced to points of entry where detection of nuclear and radioactive materials or other illicit goods is more likely.</li> <li>• Sustained improvement in the budget and patrol capabilities of the GBP.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	The United States has provided portable radiation detection equipment, thermal imaging cameras, personal utility tool belts, training, and other support for this project. The United States also constructed a patrol outpost along one section of the green border, but additional donors will be needed to provide portable outposts in other sectors and perhaps other equipment and training.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
Project #3. Monitoring Green Borders with Aviation Assets

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To improve monitoring of the border areas between established points of entry through the provision of patrol aircraft.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Georgian Ministry of Defense (MOD) or other relevant agencies.
<b>Need</b>	<p>Border security at Georgia’s green borders (areas between established points of entry) is limited. In most of these areas, there are either no roads or very poor ones. Small aircraft could be used to establish a daily patrol posture along the borders. In coordination with border security personnel on the ground, these aviation patrols could force traffic toward established border crossings where detection of nuclear smuggling or other contraband would be more likely. Georgia has several MI-8 helicopters that are used primarily to re-supply remote border posts, but these helicopters consume too much fuel to be used efficiently for regular patrols. The use of small planes would cut down the cost of patrolling the green borders and would provide a much safer border situation. Georgia has expressed interest in using air patrols with small planes but has not established a strategic plan to clarify its various missions and the equipment, training, and maintenance requirements to achieve these missions. The consolidation of the Georgian Border Police (GBP) Aviation Unit into the MOD makes it particularly important for the MOD and Georgian government as a whole to develop a long-term strategic plan for incorporating aviation assets into its border monitoring.</p>
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Once the strategic plan has been developed, an international donor could provide the GOG with several small, fuel-efficient aircraft that are capable of conducting slow patrols, both at low altitudes and in the mountains.</li> <li>• Support related pilot and mechanic training and 24 months of manufacturer-recommended spares and consumables for preventive maintenance.</li> <li>• Coordinate closely with existing U.S. and international assistance providers, the MOD, and other relevant Georgian agencies.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular, sustained aerial patrolling of green border areas, in coordination with border security personnel on the ground.</li> <li>• Increased interdiction of smuggling along the green borders.</li> <li>• Cross-border traffic forced to points of entry where detection of nuclear and radioactive materials or other illicit goods is more likely.</li> <li>• Reduction in overall cost of green border patrolling.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	As soon as the aviation strategic plan described above is completed, NSOI will seek international donors.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
**Project #4. Mobile Radiation Detection Patrols**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To improve the capability to detect radioactive materials trafficked within Georgia.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Ministry of Internal Affairs
<b>Need</b>	Georgia is a significant transit state for both legal and illicit goods. Border security, while improving, remains weak. Many of the border areas are mountainous and difficult to monitor. Because of the separatist conflicts in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, the central government in Tbilisi does not have control of approximately 20% of its internationally recognized land border. It is possible for smugglers to enter and exit Georgia without passing through a border checkpoint controlled by the central government. Because of these weaknesses in border security and the limited roads crossing Georgia, the most important traffic chokepoints at which to stop nuclear smuggling may not be at the border but rather at selected locations on major highways or other transit corridors within the country. However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) lacks the equipment and training they need to conduct such mobile checkpoints for radioactive materials.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide MOIA personnel with radiation detection vans and handheld detectors (personal radiation pagers, radioisotopic identifiers, and radiation survey meters) to establish mobile patrols along key highways and other chokepoints. These checkpoints could target areas adjacent to the separatist zones, where transnational traffic would not have otherwise crossed through a border checkpoint controlled by the central government.</li> <li>• Provide training to the MOIA on nuclear smuggling trends, operation and maintenance of the equipment, and the appropriate response procedures if radioactive material is discovered.</li> <li>• Coordinate with U.S. assistance providers to ensure the equipment deployed is compatible with equipment used on the borders and takes advantage of existing assets for support and maintenance.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MOIA personnel equipped with radiation detection equipment and appropriately trained.</li> <li>• Regular and periodic checkpoints established along major transit corridors within Georgia.</li> <li>• An additional layer of defense created for the government to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling through Georgia.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	This project is fully funded by the U.S. Department of Energy.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
Project #5. Support for Georgian Coast Guard

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To improve monitoring of Georgia’s maritime zones through increased patrolling of its coastline.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Georgian Coast Guard
<b>Need</b>	Georgia’s ports on the Black Sea present a significant vulnerability for the smuggling of nuclear or radioactive material out of Georgia and into Europe or elsewhere. The U.S. Coast Guard, through the U.S. Georgian Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) Assistance and the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) programs, has provided the Georgian Coast Guard (GCG) with boats, equipment, and training to better monitor Georgia’s maritime zones and interdict suspect cargo. A significant portion of these boats and equipment was destroyed or severely damaged in August 2008. Other GCG assets and equipment (spare parts, computers, and desks) were also destroyed or taken away.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide additional patrol vessels, repair and refurbish existing vessels, and support maintenance and operations costs, if needed.</li> <li>• Upgrade Coast Guard infrastructure, including repair and refueling facilities.</li> <li>• Provide additional communications equipment for the GCG.</li> <li>• Provide funding to replace assets and equipment (such as spare parts, computers, and desks) that were either destroyed or taken away in August 2008.</li> <li>• Continue training that includes maritime law enforcement, Coast Guard operations, and English language courses.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustained improvement in the patrol capabilities and range of the Georgian Coast Guard.</li> <li>• Regular, sustained patrolling of coastal areas.</li> <li>• Increased interdiction of contraband in maritime traffic.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	The United States is providing significant support for the GCG, including repair of ships, refurbishment of the GCG repair facility, and training. The United States is also helping to construct five new coastal radar stations, send the signals to a mobile command center, and integrate the data from these radar stations with other GCG communications systems. To maximize the sustainability and range of Coast Guard patrols, additional donors are needed to rebuild a pier at the GCG base in Poti and construct refueling stations along the Georgian coast.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:  
Project #6. Development of a National Coordination Center**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To develop a center to coordinate the border security and law enforcement activities of relevant Georgian agencies.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Multiple agencies involved in border security and law enforcement activities
<b>Need</b>	A critical component of reducing the threat of nuclear smuggling is facilitating effective cooperation between border security and law enforcement agencies. The August 2008 conflict also demonstrated gaps in the ability of Georgian agencies to communicate and coordinate response efforts in crises. A national coordination center would help improve real-time communication and provide a venue for cooperation among all relevant agencies both in carrying out their normal duties and in time of crisis. The Georgian Coast Guard, Customs, Border Police, and other agencies have expressed strong support for such a center, and they desire to be participants in it.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide support to develop a national coordination center.</li> <li>• Provide or upgrade the communications and IT infrastructure for the center.</li> <li>• Assist with developing standard operating procedures to reflect joint agency commitment and response (especially in responding to detections of nuclear or radioactive materials).</li> <li>• Train participants and help create an indigenous training and qualification program for assigned personnel.</li> <li>• Coordinate closely with existing U.S. and international assistance providers and relevant Georgian agencies.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A coordination center is established and provides real-time communication and coordination capabilities for all agencies involved in border security and law enforcement activities.</li> <li>• New standard operating procedures developed and implemented to clarify roles among various agencies.</li> <li>• Capability improved to plan and set priorities on border, maritime, and law enforcement security issues that cut across multiple agencies.</li> <li>• Capability improved to communicate and coordinate response efforts in crises.</li> <li>• The function of intelligence fusion is improved.</li> <li>• Capability improved to respond to an orphan source discovery or smuggling incident.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	The U.S. Department of Defense will fund this project, at least partially, but additional donors may be needed.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:  
Project #7. Improving Nuclear Forensics Capabilities – ITWG Participation**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To improve Georgia’s nuclear forensics capabilities by increasing its participation in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG).
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Relevant technical experts and law enforcement officials determined by the Government of Georgia
<b>Need</b>	Press reports of illicit trafficking in highly enriched uranium in Georgia highlight the importance for Georgia to have the capabilities to analyze any seized materials, trace the diversion path, prosecute the offenders, and coordinate such efforts with international partners. Participation in the ITWG would help Georgian scientists and law enforcement officials develop relationships with the international forensics community and increase their forensic and attribution knowledge and capabilities, which is particularly useful when examining seized material of unknown origin. Wider participation also increases the international knowledge base, which plays a critical factor in attribution during forensics testing of seized material.
<b>Project Activities</b>	A potential donor could sponsor a Georgian scientist and a law enforcement representative to attend the annual ITWG meeting.
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanded forensics capabilities of Georgia’s scientific community.</li> <li>• Improved cooperation between Georgian technical experts and law enforcement community.</li> <li>• Improved contacts and cooperation between Georgian scientists and other scientists in the international nuclear forensics community with increased participation in nuclear forensic table-top and analytic exercises.</li> <li>• Improved contacts and cooperation between elements of the Georgian law enforcement community and their international counterparts.</li> <li>• Create framework for closer adherence to the international best practices on nuclear forensics reflected in the IAEA Nuclear Forensics Support Reference Manual (2006).</li> <li>• Through outreach, establish indigenous nuclear forensics capabilities for categorization and characterization.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Project funded by the European Union and United States.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:  
Project #8. Developing and Exercising a National Response Plan**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To develop a plan for responding to incidents of nuclear smuggling in line with international best practices.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Various agencies
<b>Need</b>	Responding to nuclear smuggling incidents requires the cooperation and coordination of technical experts, border security personnel, law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and others. A number of IAEA documents, including the Nuclear Security Series Document #2 and the Nuclear Security Series Document #6, provide guidance on best practices for nuclear forensics and responding to nuclear smuggling incidents. Georgia needs additional training to develop a national response plan that reflects the best practices outlined in these IAEA documents and other international standards. Recent reports of illicit trafficking in highly-enriched uranium in Georgia highlight the importance for Georgia to have well developed response procedures to ensure public safety, timely analysis of any seized materials, and effective prosecution of the offenders.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Define requirements necessary to respond effectively to and fully prosecute nuclear smuggling.</li> <li>• Organize a table-top exercise to test existing response procedures and identify possible gaps or overlaps.</li> <li>• Help draft a national response plan that specifies the roles and responsibilities of each agency in line with the IAEA guidance.</li> <li>• Organize additional exercises and training as well as technical exchanges to ensure effective execution of the response plan.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National response plan that clearly identifies the roles of each agency in responding to various smuggling incidents is drafted and approved.</li> <li>• Improved coordination among Georgian ministries and with their international counterparts.</li> <li>• A regular program of exercises is implemented.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Project is funded by the United States and European Union. In May 2009, the U.S. Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) organized a table-top exercise in Tbilisi. The United States and European Union are currently helping Georgia to draft a national response plan based on the lessons learned from this exercise.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
Project #9. Improving Communications and Coordination among Law Enforcement and  
Border Security Personnel

<b>Project Purpose</b>	Equip law enforcement and border security personnel with secure communications equipment.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA), Border Police, Customs, Nuclear and Radioactive Safety Service (NRSS), and other agencies
<b>Need</b>	During the August 2008 conflict, communications between law enforcement officers in the field and headquarters broke down or relied on mobile phones, which do not provide secure links. Moreover, communications and cooperation between agencies, while improving, remain problematic. Georgia needs secure radios for the MOIA, Border Police, Customs, and NRSS; relay towers in Tbilisi and throughout the country; and an improved ability to collect data from various agencies and coordinate the response across various ministries.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide the MOIA, Border Police, Customs Service, NRSS, and other agencies with portable radios that can provide reliable, robust, secure, and compatible communications.</li> <li>• Provide relay towers or other infrastructure upgrades as needed.</li> <li>• Help establish improved coordination among law enforcement and border security personnel.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All response agencies nationwide equipped with secure communications technology that allows them to communicate with their counterparts in other agencies.</li> <li>• Procedures established for real-time operational coordination.</li> <li>• Improved coordination among law enforcement and border security agencies.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	The United States will provide at least partial funding for infrastructure to establish a secure communications system, provide secure radios for some MOIA and Border Police personnel, and hire an integrator to ensure the compatibility of existing and new communications equipment and infrastructure. Additional donors will be needed to provide radios and infrastructure to ensure that Customs, NRSS, and all Border Police and relevant MOIA officers have access to this system.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
**Project #10. Support for the Institute of Physics**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	Develop the capacity of the Institute of Physics to conduct training and technical support to other agencies combating nuclear smuggling.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Andronikashvili Institute of Physics (IOP)
<b>Need</b>	The IOP is a key repository of technical knowledge on nuclear and radioactive materials in Georgia. IOP staff has conducted a number of trainings for other agencies responsible for combating nuclear smuggling, but the IOP lacks the facilities and resources to develop these efforts into a more systematic training program. Several different agencies in Georgia operate radiation detection equipment, and they need to have basic knowledge of nuclear and radioactive materials in order to effectively interdict nuclear smuggling. Many of the agencies have the same types of equipment but lack the resources and expertise to maintain, repair, and calibrate this equipment. Centralizing at least part of the training efforts and equipment maintenance functions for these agencies under the IOP would take advantage of the technical expertise of IOP staff and promote economies of scale in maintenance efforts. Additionally, the IOP houses some of the residual equipment and materials from Georgia’s dismantled research reactor, which needs to be provided with adequate security.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide computers and other equipment for several rooms at the IOP to provide adequate facilities to conduct trainings for other agencies.</li> <li>• Support the IOP’s efforts to do basic training on radiation and radioactive material for other relevant agencies.</li> <li>• Provide the IOP with training and technical assistance so that it can provide centralized repair, maintenance, and calibration services for the detection equipment of all Georgian agencies. This should focus on handheld detection equipment, at least initially, as U.S. Department of Energy is currently providing financial support to maintain the fixed radiation monitors installed through the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program.</li> <li>• Provide physical security upgrades at the IOP.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IOP becomes a center of excellence to share its expertise on nuclear and radioactive materials with other agencies responsible for combating nuclear smuggling.</li> <li>• All relevant agencies nationwide can receive basic training on radiation and radioactive material.</li> <li>• All relevant agencies nationwide provided with repair, maintenance, and calibration services for their detection equipment</li> <li>• IOP facility maintains adequate security.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Sweden is upgrading physical security and providing equipment and training to support the IOP’s efforts to train other agencies. Sweden may help IOP develop the capacity to provide centralized repair maintenance and calibration services for detection equipment, but is waiting for the Georgian government to formally designate the IOP as the location for the centralized calibration center.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
Project #11. Securing Radioactive Materials at Vulnerable Facilities

<b>Project Purpose</b>	Remove or secure vulnerable, high-activity radioactive materials before they can be stolen and trafficked.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Nuclear Radiation and Safety Service (NRSS) and selected organizations
<b>Need</b>	Several facilities were recently identified with vulnerable radioactive materials. While the financial responsibility for securing these sources lies with the owner, the organizations where these sources are located lack the resources to either secure them in place or pay for their transportation into secure storage. The NRSS also does not have sufficient resources to pay for security upgrades or transportation into secure storage.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For those sources no longer in use, a prospective donor could fund the packaging and transportation of these sources into the centralized storage facility at Mtskheta. If the sources cannot be moved in a reasonably short time frame, a prospective donor could provide interim security upgrades or monitoring equipment.</li> <li>• For those sources still in use, a prospective donor could support appropriate security upgrades, such as hardened doors and windows, fences, alarms, closed-circuit television, and/or additional guards.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-activity radioactive materials consolidated and secured.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) funded the removal of a high-level radioactive source at one facility. The DOE and United Kingdom will provide at least partial funding for cleaning out two other sites. Additional donors may be needed to complete this project.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
**Project #12. Locating and Securing Orphan Sources**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To find and secure orphan or otherwise vulnerable radioactive sources to prevent them from being trafficked or used in a radiological dispersal device.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Nuclear Radiation and Safety Service (NRSS), Ministry of Internal Affairs, (MOIA), and Ministry of Justice (MOJ)
<b>Need</b>	Georgia has a significant problem with orphan and otherwise unsecured radioactive sources. These sources could be stolen, trafficked, and used in a dirty bomb if discovered before they are adequately secured. Even if discovered accidentally, these sources present a danger to the surrounding population. The U.S. Department of Energy previously provided equipment and training to the NRSS to search for and secure sources, but it is unclear if the NRSS has sufficient resources to conduct these searches. A recent feasibility study funded by the United Kingdom highlighted this problem and noted that four sources were found in 2009 on territory that had been previously searched in 2007. Some of these sources may be held by individuals or organizations that either cannot afford the normal disposal fees or are afraid they would be fined or prosecuted if they revealed that they were in possession of unlicensed radioactive materials. The UK study recommended that an amnesty program be developed to convince such holders of radioactive materials to turn these materials over to the proper authorities and to inform the public of the dangers of such sources.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide financial resources to the NRSS to conduct additional searches.</li> <li>• Work with the NRSS, MOIA, and MOJ to draft a law providing temporary amnesty for individuals or organizations illegally keeping radioactive sources, so that these sources can be transferred to state ownership and stored securely.</li> <li>• The amnesty effort should be accompanied by a public media campaign to educate the general public about the dangers of these materials and the appropriate response if such materials are discovered.</li> <li>• Provide financial support to the NRSS to offset the costs of picking up sources declared as part of the amnesty program.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unknown and previously hidden radioactive materials are found, declared, and secured.</li> <li>• Greater public awareness created of the dangers of radioactive materials.</li> <li>• Greater public knowledge created of the proper procedures to follow if such materials are discovered.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	This project is funded by the United States and United Kingdom. The United States and United Kingdom plan to fund additional searches. The UK is considering funding the legal and public awareness components of the amnesty campaign. The U.S. Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) plans to cover the costs of picking up those sources declared as part of the amnesty campaign. Other donors likely are needed to fund additional searches.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
Project #13. Improving Security for the Saakadze Waste Depository

<b>Project Purpose</b>	Provide security upgrades for the old Soviet radioactive waste disposal facility near Saakadze.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Nuclear Radiation and Safety Service (NRSS)
<b>Need</b>	The NRSS recently informed several international partners that the old Soviet radioactive waste disposal facility may not have adequate security for the large number of radioactive sources present at this facility. This facility has not accepted new sources for many years, but it still contains a large number of Soviet-era radioactive sources. While most of the sources remain buried and difficult to access, additional fencing, perimeter security, and remote monitoring would significantly improve security.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fund physical security upgrades at the facility, such as fences, monitoring, closed-circuit television, vehicle barriers, and/or sealing off potential access points with additional concrete or earth.</li> <li>• Given the remote location of the facility, it will be important to work with the local population to ensure they are aware of the dangers of theft from the facility and to develop a system to monitor the facility that can be sustained with limited cost.</li> <li>• Since the site has buried sources which would be difficult and time-consuming to access, security upgrades which further delay their removal and monitoring of the site is the simplest way to reduce the risk of misuse. However, a longer term solution which takes account of broader safety risks may be warranted.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Materials at Saakadze remain secure.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	The United Kingdom and Sweden are working together to assess the number and condition of the sources in the facility and address immediate physical security needs. Additional assistance may be needed.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help Georgia Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**  
**Project #14. Reviewing the Georgian Legal System’s Ability to Prosecute All Cases of**  
**Nuclear Smuggling**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To ensure that Georgia’s legal code can prosecute all cases of nuclear smuggling, including scams, and to enforce appropriate sentences.
<b>Georgian Recipient</b>	Chief Prosecutor’s Office
<b>Need</b>	The Government of Georgia has declared that it has insufficient legislation for the prosecution nuclear scams, in which individuals try to sell non-radioactive materials while claiming these are dangerous nuclear or radioactive materials. If these individuals are not jailed, they may succeed in smuggling more dangerous materials. Also, such scams divert law enforcement attention from more serious cases.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A donor could provide a legal expert to consult with Georgian officials and review the criminal code.</li> <li>• Additional assistance could help in revising existing laws or developing new laws, as needed, to address any type of nuclear smuggling case that cannot currently be prosecuted.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To increase prosecution of all nuclear smuggling cases, including scams.</li> <li>• To jail current smugglers and scam artists and deter such activities in the future.</li> <li>• To decrease the number of nuclear smuggling scams, thereby decreasing the amount of time spent by law enforcement agencies investigating fraudulent cases.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	In December 2010 the U.S. Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) convened a workshop to review the Georgian criminal code and recommend revisions where needed.

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