

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**

Project #1. Improving Control and Accounting of Radioactive Materials

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To develop further the Kyrgyz Republic’s radioactive source registry and strengthen its regulatory infrastructure
<b>Recipient</b>	State Agency for Environmental Protection and Forestry (executive agency for technical cooperation between the Kyrgyz Republic and the IAEA) and the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism (executive agency responsible for accounting and control of nuclear materials)
<b>Need</b>	The Kyrgyz Republic has worked with the IAEA to develop a registry of radioactive sources and to revise its regulatory laws and regulations to improve control of these sources. Implementation of these efforts has been slowed by limited resources and a shortage of trained personnel. To diminish the vulnerability of radioactive sources in the Kyrgyz Republic to theft and illicit trafficking, these efforts should be completed.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide financial and technical assistance to help compile the registry of radioactive sources and to review current laws and make any needed revisions to bring these in line with IAEA standards.</li> <li>• Provide financial support for the Kyrgyz Republic to add permanent regulatory personnel and provide training, computers, and inspection equipment for these new personnel.</li> <li>• A prospective donor should work closely with the IAEA on this project, as the IAEA has done several assessment missions and developed recommendations for improving control of radioactive sources.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved accounting and control of radioactive sources throughout the Kyrgyz Republic.</li> <li>• Development of a registry of radioactive sources in line with IAEA standards.</li> <li>• Laws and regulations revised to meet the standards reflected in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.</li> <li>• Regular inspections to support and maintain the source registry and enforce regulatory laws.</li> <li>• Regulatory system strengthened with additional personnel, training, and equipment.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Fully funded by the U.S.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**

Project #2. Improving Physical Security of Dangerous Radioactive Materials

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To remove vulnerable radioactive sources from circulation if they are no longer in use and to enhance security for those sources still in use.
<b>Recipient</b>	Issues regarding radiation, chemical, and biological safety fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of States of Emergency, and the State Agency for Environmental Protection and Forestry. The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism is the executive agency responsible for accounting and control of nuclear materials.
<b>Need</b>	The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provided security upgrades at two facilities in the Kyrgyz Republic with high-activity radioactive sources, but because the Kyrgyz Republic lacks a comprehensive registry of radioactive sources, additional facilities with high-activity radioactive sources may exist. Determining the existence of unaccounted for radioactive sources and increasing their security is necessary to reduce opportunity of their malicious use.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fund missions to proactively search for and secure radioactive sources in the Kyrgyz Republic. This would likely include funding for local salaries, transportation costs, travel, and per diem, as well as administrative support for developing an effective search plan for each facility.</li> <li>• Secure any discovered disused sources in the waste storage facility outside Bishkek.</li> <li>• If these searches revealed any facilities with vulnerable radioactive sources still in use, fund physical security upgrades at these facilities.</li> <li>• Provide support for one or two international experts to accompany Kyrgyz teams and share valuable experience.</li> <li>• For interested donors without existing implementing mechanisms for such assistance, partnering with DOE and/or the IAEA could provide a mechanism to support these activities in the Kyrgyz Republic.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted searches and statistical sampling provide a high level of confidence that facilities searched remain free of radioactive sources.</li> <li>• In the long-term, all significant sources identified and placed under regulatory control or removed to a secure storage facility.</li> <li>• Search missions conducted regularly and integrated into the regulatory infrastructure.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Seeking international donors

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**

Project #3. Improving Radiation Detection Capability at Points of Entry

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials at airports and border crossings.
<b>Recipient</b>	Department of Customs Service (DCS) and State Border Guard Service (SBGS)
<b>Need</b>	The Kyrgyz Republic’s international points of entry (POEs) do not have adequate radiation detection equipment, and its personnel do not have adequate training, to effectively detect illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. Some remote outposts lack basic equipment and cold weather gear. The Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program and the Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) program are currently working with the Kyrgyz Republic to better secure its borders, but additional efforts are needed. Prospective donors could work with the SLD program to provide radiation detection equipment and training without negotiating a separate legal agreement with the Kyrgyz Republic. Prospective donors could also work in close coordination with DCS, SBGS, and the U.S. government to provide complementary equipment at priority sites and ensure compatibility with existing equipment.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide equipment and training at specific points of entry (POEs). Generally this equipment includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Portal monitors, related communications equipment, and central alarm stations</li> <li>○ Handheld radiation detectors for secondary inspections</li> <li>○ Barrett radios</li> <li>○ CT-30 inspection kits</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Provide funds for training DCS and SBGS personnel to learn how to properly use the equipment, if they are not already proficient from indigenous or USG training on similar equipment.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanded and sustained capacity of the DCS and SBGS to detect illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.</li> <li>• Increased percentage of traffic scanned for radioactive contraband.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Finland will provide partial support for this project, but additional donors will still be needed.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear  
Smuggling:  
Project #4. Improving Security at Green Borders**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials along green borders.
<b>Recipient</b>	State Border Guard Service (SBGS)
<b>Need</b>	Green borders, those areas between established points of entry, have little or no security, which presents a significant vulnerability that could be exploited by smugglers. The SBGS has responsibility for monitoring the green borders, but suffers from lack of equipment and training. The high elevation, rough terrain, and often harsh weather make many of these border areas difficult to adequately patrol. These vulnerabilities have been exploited by drug smugglers and terrorists from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the past. The borders with Tajikistan and China are a particular concern. The U.S. State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program has successfully pilot-tested a modular shelter, which can be deployed to remote border areas to provide a base of operations for patrolling the green border. This is particularly valuable in winter, when the lack of adequate shelter often limits the border guard’s ability to leave major bases and conduct regular patrol operations. The Kyrgyz have requested additional shelters. The U.S. will provide more shelters, but additional assistance is needed to provide adequate coverage of all priority border areas.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide modular structures to monitor small border posts and provide a base of operations to patrol the surrounding region.</li> <li>• Provide additional vehicles, communications equipment, portable radiation detection equipment, and training to help the SBGS better patrol these areas to prevent and detect smuggling.</li> <li>• Provide remote sensing equipment and appropriate training to monitor areas where regular patrolling is not feasible or cost-effective.</li> <li>• Coordinate with the SBGS and ongoing assistance programs from the U.S. and other donors to determine specific priorities and to ensure compatible equipment.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Immediate and sustained, expanded capacity of the SBGS to detect and interdict illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods along green borders.</li> <li>• More cross-border traffic forced towards established points of entry where detection of radioactive contraband is more likely.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	The EXBS program, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and NSOI have funded this project.

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**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear  
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Project #5. Improving Nuclear Forensics Capabilities

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To improve the Kyrgyz Republic’s nuclear forensics capabilities by increasing its participation in the International Technical Working Group (ITWG) on nuclear forensics.
<b>Recipient</b>	Relevant technical experts and law enforcement officials determined by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.
<b>Need</b>	Participation in the ITWG would help scientists from the Kyrgyz Republic and law enforcement officials develop relationships with the international forensics community and increase their forensic and attribution knowledge and capabilities, which is particularly useful when examining seized material of unknown origin. Wider participation also increases the international knowledge base, which plays a critical factor in attribution during forensics testing of seized material.
<b>Project Activities</b>	A potential donor could sponsor a Kyrgyz scientist and a law enforcement representative to attend the annual ITWG meeting.
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanded forensics capabilities of the Kyrgyz Republic’s scientific community.</li> <li>• Improved cooperation between technical experts and law enforcement community of the Kyrgyz Republic.</li> <li>• Improved contacts and cooperation between Kyrgyz scientists and other scientists in the international nuclear forensics community.</li> <li>• Improved contacts and cooperation between the Kyrgyz law enforcement community and their international counterparts.</li> <li>• Closer adherence to the international best practices on nuclear forensics reflected in the IAEA Nuclear Forensics Support Reference Manual (2006).</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Project funded by the U.S.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear  
Smuggling:  
Project #6. Anti-Corruption Assistance**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To decrease opportunities for corruption among personnel combating nuclear smuggling and reduce the influence of corruption on anti-smuggling assistance programs.
<b>Recipient</b>	Multiple agencies.
<b>Need</b>	As in many parts of the world, corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic remains a serious problem, which could undermine indigenous and international efforts to improve capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling. Corruption within agencies responsible for protecting radioactive materials could lead to insider thefts. Corruption among border security officials could lead to bribes to overlook smuggling or to enable smugglers to avoid radiation detection equipment. Corruption in law enforcement agencies could undermine the Kyrgyz Republic’s efforts to prosecute nuclear smugglers. The Kyrgyz Republic acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, issued an edict in October 2005 “On Urgent Measures to Fight against Corruption,” and established the National Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic for preventing corruption. International technical and financial assistance could be useful to help the Kyrgyz Republic implement these commitments.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Help individual agencies develop anti-corruption strategies and strong ethical and administrative standards.</li> <li>• Provide anti-corruption training for personnel and incorporate such training into standard training curricula.</li> <li>• Eliminate opportunities for corruption at border points by revising procedures to improve transparency and increasing the use of standardized risk assessment models to determine what is searched.</li> <li>• Provide financial support for technical accountability measures at borders such as cameras and radiation monitors that report all detections or any instances in which detection equipment is turned off to central alarm stations.</li> <li>• Strengthen monitoring and enforcement of ethical and administrative standards.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decreased influence of corruption reflected in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index and global corruption report.</li> <li>• Survey evidence showing a reduced number of users who made unofficial payments.</li> <li>• Increased and consistent levels of aggregate customs revenues (as a proxy measure of professionalism and integrity).</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Seeking international donors

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