

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**

Project #1. Improving Control and Accounting of Radioactive Materials

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To strengthen the Kyrgyz Republic’s regulatory infrastructure and further develop its radioactive source registry.
<b>Recipient</b>	Agency for Atomic and Radiological Safety (AARS)
<b>Need</b>	The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) have helped the Kyrgyz Republic review its nuclear laws and regulations and make revisions where needed to bring them in line with international standards. GTRI has conducted a National Infrastructure Assessment, and both NRC and GTRI are involved in discussions on how to improve the regulatory authority. The IAEA has sent an advisory mission to review the nuclear regulatory regime and recommend improvements, and it has offered training for all personnel involved in radioactive source security. To complement these efforts, the Kyrgyz Republic needs assistance in revising its nuclear laws to give the AARS the authority to regulate all radioactive materials and in developing implementing regulations on physical security, emergency response, and transport security. The AARS also needs assistance in reviewing its staffing and organizational structure and training its personnel. It also likely needs additional dosimeters, radiation detection equipment, and other equipment to carry out its duties fully. Regarding the radioactive source registry, the NRC helped the Kyrgyz Republic develop its basic registry in December 2009. Additional aid is needed to help AARS develop an information technology infrastructure to add newly discovered radioactive sources to the database and maintain the registry efficiently.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assist the development of new laws and amendments that are consistent with IAEA recommendations.</li> <li>• Assist the development of regulations on physical security, emergency response, and transport security.</li> <li>• Train staff on the development of an inspection regime to enforce regulations.</li> <li>• Train staff at AARS and facility operators in physical security, emergency response, and transport security.</li> <li>• Review the AARS’s staffing and organizational structure.</li> <li>• Provide dosimeters, radiation detectors, and other necessary equipment.</li> <li>• Purchase laptop computers and other necessary technology for an IT network.</li> <li>• A prospective donor should work closely with the NRC, GTRI, and the IAEA to ensure the assistance complements efficiently the work these organizations have already done and continue to do.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Laws and regulations revised to meet the standards reflected in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.</li> <li>• AARS established as an independent, effective nuclear regulator.</li> <li>• A registry of radioactive sources maintained in line with IAEA standards.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Funding provided by the U.S. and the IAEA, but additional donors needed.

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, [staffordmi@state.gov](mailto:staffordmi@state.gov), 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**

Project #2. Improving Physical Security of Dangerous Radioactive Materials

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To remove vulnerable radioactive sources from circulation if they are no longer in use and to enhance security for those sources still in use.
<b>Recipient</b>	Currently, the State Agency for Environmental Protection and Forestry. Ultimately, the Agency for Atomic and Radiological Safety (AARS).
<b>Need</b>	The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provided search and secure equipment to the State Agency of Environmental Protection and Forestry of the Kyrgyz Republic in May 2006. However, the Kyrgyz Republic could use an additional suite of modern equipment, which would also require training on use and maintenance of the equipment as well as conducting targeted searches. The Kyrgyz Republic has identified several sites to search and would benefit from funding for five-to-ten search missions. It needs to clean out five-ten facilities with disused, highly active sources, and it may discover additional facilities in need of cleanout during search and secure missions. To conduct cleanouts, the Kyrgyz Republic needs specialized containers, packaging equipment, and a specialized truck to transport sources to secure storage. Additionally, DOE has provided security upgrades at two facilities with high-activity radioactive sources, but Kyrgyz officials may discover additional facilities in need of physical security upgrades during search and secure missions. Kyrgyz response forces also need training and equipment to enhance their capability to respond to alarms at facilities where radioactive materials are stored.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a suite of equipment for search and secure missions, as well as training on its use and maintenance and on conducting targeted searches.</li> <li>• Fund five-to-ten missions to search for and secure radioactive sources. This would likely include funding for local salaries, transportation costs, travel, and per diem, as well as administrative support for developing an effective search plan for each facility. It may also include support for one or two international experts to accompany Kyrgyz teams and share valuable experience.</li> <li>• Fund cleanout of any facilities with disused, highly active sources.</li> <li>• Provide specialized containers, packaging equipment, and a specialized truck to transport disused sources to the waste storage facility outside Bishkek.</li> <li>• If the searches revealed any facilities with vulnerable radioactive sources still in use, fund physical security upgrades at these facilities.</li> <li>• Provide response force equipment and training.</li> <li>• A prospective donor should work closely with DOE on this project, to ensure the aid complements efficiently the work DOE is doing.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted searches and statistical sampling provide a high level of confidence that facilities searched remain free of radioactive sources.</li> <li>• In the long-term, all significant sources identified and placed under secure regulatory control or removed to a secure storage facility.</li> <li>• Search missions conducted regularly and integrated into the regulatory infrastructure.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Funding provided by the U.S., but additional donors needed.

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, [staffordmi@state.gov](mailto:staffordmi@state.gov), 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**

Project #3. Improving Radiation Detection Capability at Points of Entry

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials at airports and border crossings.
<b>Recipient</b>	State Customs Service (SCS) and State Border Guard Service (SBGS)
<b>Need</b>	The Kyrgyz Republic’s international points of entry (POEs) do not have adequate radiation detection equipment, and its personnel do not have adequate training to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. Some remote POEs lack basic equipment and cold weather gear. The Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program and the Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) program are currently working with the Kyrgyz Republic to secure its borders, but additional efforts are needed. Prospective donors could work with the EXBS and SLD programs to provide radiation detection equipment and training without negotiating a separate legal agreement with the Kyrgyz Republic.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide equipment and training at specific points of entry (POEs). Generally this equipment includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Portal monitors, related communications equipment, and central alarm stations</li> <li>○ Handheld radiation detectors for secondary inspections</li> <li>○ Barrett radios</li> <li>○ CT-30 inspection kits</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Provide funds for training DCS and SBGS personnel to learn how to use the equipment properly, if they are not already proficient from indigenous or U.S. training on similar equipment.</li> <li>• A prospective donor should work closely with EXBS and SLD on this project, to ensure the assistance efforts complement efficiently the work these programs have already done and continue to do.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanded and sustained capacity of the DCS and SBGS to detect illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.</li> <li>• Increased percentage of traffic scanned for radioactive contraband.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Finland, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy’s SLD program, has contributed multiple times to this project, and the SLD and EXBS programs continue to provide additional equipment and training; however, additional donors are still needed.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear  
Smuggling:  
Project #4. Improving Security at Green Borders**

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials along green borders.
<b>Recipient</b>	State Border Guard Service (SBGS)
<b>Need</b>	Green borders, those areas between established points of entry, have little or no security, which presents a significant vulnerability that could be exploited by smugglers. The SBGS has responsibility for monitoring the green borders, but suffers from lack of equipment and training. The high elevation, rough terrain, and often harsh weather make many of these border areas difficult to adequately patrol. These vulnerabilities have been exploited by drug smugglers and terrorists from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the past. The U.S. State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program has developed with the SBGS a plan to equip 26 key border locations with modular shelters, watchtowers, communications gear, and other equipment. This allows the Border Guards stationed at each location to monitor the immediate area and patrol the surrounding countryside. With some support from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and NSOI, EXBS has completed installation of the modular shelters and watchtowers at these locations and has funded communications gear. Additional assistance should be directed toward funding 26 additional watchtowers and providing equipment needed at the towers, such as binoculars and portable searchlights.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide watchtowers to be collocated with modular structures that provide a base of operations to patrol the surrounding region.</li> <li>• Provide additional equipment to help the SBGS better monitor green border areas to prevent and detect smuggling.</li> <li>• Coordinate with the SBGS and ongoing assistance programs from the U.S. and other donors to determine specific priorities and to ensure compatible equipment.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Immediate and sustained, expanded capacity of the SBGS to detect and interdict illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods along green borders.</li> <li>• More cross-border traffic forced towards established points of entry where detection of radioactive contraband is more likely.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	The EXBS program, CENTCOM, and NSOI have funded this project, but additional donors are still needed.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**

Project #5. Improving Nuclear Forensics Capabilities

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To improve the Kyrgyz Republic’s nuclear forensics capabilities by increasing its participation in the International Technical Working Group (ITWG) on nuclear forensics.
<b>Recipient</b>	Relevant technical experts and law enforcement officials determined by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.
<b>Need</b>	Participation in the ITWG would help scientists from the Kyrgyz Republic and law enforcement officials develop relationships with the international forensics community and increase their forensic and attribution knowledge and capabilities, which is particularly useful when examining seized material of unknown origin. Wider participation also increases the international knowledge base, which plays a critical factor in attribution during forensics testing of seized material.
<b>Project Activities</b>	A potential donor could sponsor a Kyrgyz scientist and a law enforcement representative to attend the annual ITWG meeting.
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanded forensics capabilities of the Kyrgyz Republic’s scientific community.</li> <li>• Improved cooperation between technical experts and law enforcement community of the Kyrgyz Republic.</li> <li>• Improved contacts and cooperation between Kyrgyz scientists and other scientists in the international nuclear forensics community.</li> <li>• Improved contacts and cooperation between the Kyrgyz law enforcement community and their international counterparts.</li> <li>• Closer adherence to the international best practices on nuclear forensics reflected in the IAEA Nuclear Forensics Support Reference Manual (2006).</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Project funded by the U.S.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help the Kyrgyz Republic Combat Nuclear Smuggling:**

Project #6. Anti-Corruption Assistance

<b>Project Purpose</b>	To decrease opportunities for corruption among personnel combating nuclear smuggling and reduce the influence of corruption on anti-smuggling assistance programs.
<b>Recipient</b>	State Border Guards Service, State Customs Service.
<b>Need</b>	As in many parts of the world, corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic remains a serious problem, which could undermine indigenous and international efforts to improve capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling. The Kyrgyz Republic has taken numerous steps in recent years to combat corruption. It acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, issued an edict in October 2005 “On Urgent Measures to Fight against Corruption,” and established the National Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic for preventing corruption. The Customs Service has tightened hiring and retention practices, increased pay and developed a bonus system to reduce incentives to take bribes, installed surveillance cameras at customs checkpoints, developed electronic declarations and cashless transactions to reduce human involvement in the customs process, held regular inspections by the General Prosecutors Office and Chamber of Accounts, and established Internal Investigation Units. The Border Guard Service has established a hotline at border crossing points to allow people to call a 24-hour service center to report corruption, held regular coordination meetings with the anti-corruption business council, staffed the Manas International Airport and other non-land points of entry with representatives of the anti-corruption business council, and established an internal investigation unit. In March 2011, the Kyrgyz government requested additional international technical and financial assistance to further these efforts by connecting radiation portal monitors and surveillance cameras to a central location or locations and installing additional cameras.
<b>Project Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide financial support to connect radiation portal monitors at border points to a central headquarters to ensure that authorities are aware of all detections or any instances in which detection equipment is turned off.</li> <li>• Eliminate opportunities for corruption by funding purchase and installation of additional video surveillance cameras at border posts and other key locations.</li> <li>• Connect the surveillance cameras to one or more central monitoring locations, including the same center that receives data from radiation alarms.</li> </ul>
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decreased influence of corruption reflected in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index and global corruption report.</li> <li>• Survey evidence showing a reduced number of users who made unofficial payments.</li> <li>• Increased and consistent levels of aggregate customs revenues (as a proxy measure of professionalism and integrity).</li> </ul>
<b>Project Status</b>	Seeking international donors

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, [staffordmi@state.gov](mailto:staffordmi@state.gov), 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.