

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #1. Security of Radiological Sources

Project Purpose	To improve security at facilities with high-activity radiological sources.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU)
Need	The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through its Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) program, is currently working with Ukraine to identify and upgrade security at vulnerable facilities that have high-activity radioactive sources that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD).
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work with the Ukrainian government and U.S. DOE to identify priority facilities with high-activity sources, which may include radioactive sources used in medicine, industrial applications, agriculture, and other fields. • Conduct vulnerability assessments of the identified facilities. • Upgrade facilities with vulnerable, high-activity sources. These upgrades generally consist of cameras; motion sensors; alarms; two central monitoring stations; hardened doors, walls, and windows; and improvements to response capabilities. • Work with the SNRCU to make sure the sources are properly licensed and included in the new registry of radioactive sources where appropriate.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All facilities with high-activity radioactive sources identified and their security assessed. • Security enhanced at vulnerable facilities with high-activity radioactive sources.
Project Status	Project funded by the United States. U.S. DOE has upgraded more than 60 facilities and believes this reflects all of the sites with high-activity, vulnerable sources in Ukraine. We are not currently seeking additional donors, but if additional facilities with high-activity sources are identified in the future, there may be opportunities for additional contributions to this project.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #2. Regulatory Development to Meet IAEA Standards

Project Purpose	To accelerate Ukraine’s progress toward meeting IAEA regulatory standards.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU)
Need	The SNRCU is working with the IAEA and the United States to improve its ability to regulate radioactive sources. Some of Ukraine’s regulations for radioactive materials should be reviewed to determine if they are in compliance with the IAEA Code of Conduct and other current IAEA standards.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review Ukraine’s existing regulations on radioactive materials to see if they conform to the IAEA Code of Conduct and other IAEA standards. • Provide technical support and resources for local contractors to revise regulations, if needed.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulatory infrastructure developed to meet the IAEA Code of Conduct and other IAEA standards. • Regulatory infrastructure tailored to that of EU countries. • An internal review of Ukraine’s regulatory infrastructure conducted by SNRCU to identify the most pressing needs for the regulatory system in meeting IAEA standards. • Long-term capacity developed for the SNRCU to effectively sustain improvements made under international assistance programs, enforce appropriate physical security and safeguards, and conduct its own reviews to continually improve its regulatory infrastructure.
Project Status	Fully funded by the United States.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #3. Regulatory Development – Accelerating the Radioactive Source Registry
Development

Project Purpose	To register high-activity radioactive sources in accordance with IAEA guidelines.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU)
Need	In 2006, the SNRCU was working with the IAEA and the U.S. State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) to develop a registry of radioactive sources, but lack of trained manpower and appropriate software limited these efforts.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SNRCU provided additional manpower. • The U.S. NDF provided the training, software, and other technical support to support the completion and maintenance of a registry of radioactive sources in line with IAEA guidelines.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radioactive source registry completed. • Radioactive sources better controlled. • Long-term planning for radioactive source disposal improved.
Project Status	Project is complete with funding from Ukraine and the United States. Ukraine provided the staffing and the U.S. NDF provided software, training, and other technical support to complete the registry in December 2007.

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, staffordmi@state.gov, 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #4. Regulatory Development – Staffing and Equipping the SNRCU Regional Offices

Project Purpose	To improve inspection and enforcement capabilities through increased staffing and equipment at SNRCU regional offices.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU)
Need	In 2006, the SNRCU did not have any offices outside of Kyiv, limiting its ability to conduct inspections, enforce regulations, and develop and maintain its registry of radioactive sources. The SNRCU worked with the U.S. State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to establish and equip eight regional offices.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SNRCU provided additional personnel to staff the regional offices. • The United States provided office equipment, inspection tools, personal protection gear, vehicles, and training for the new staff.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SNRCU regional offices are staffed at levels similar to its European and western counterparts. • The SNRCU increases the number of inspections conducted.
Project Status	Project funded by Ukraine and the United States. Significant work is ongoing. In 2006 and 2007, the government of Ukraine increased the budget of the SNRCU to hire an additional 96 inspectors to ensure the regional offices are fully staffed. In 2006, the U.S. NDF assisted with the establishment of eight regional offices and provided the initial equipment and training for the personnel. In 2008 and 2009, the U.S. NRC provided basic office equipment, radiation monitoring equipment, and vehicles for use by SNRCU personnel in the regional offices U.S. NRC also continues to provide ongoing training and support for the SNRCU.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #5. Securing Orphaned and At-Risk Sources**

Project Purpose	To remove vulnerable radioactive sources from circulation and ship them to secure storage so that they cannot be trafficked.
Ukrainian Recipient	Ministry of Emergency Situations and State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU)
Need	Ukraine continues to discover a significant number of “orphaned” radioactive sources, which could be dangerous if smugglers discover these sources before they are appropriately secured. Ukrainian state and non-state actors have indicated that there may be a number of at-risk, uncontrolled, or undiscovered radioactive sources that continue to feed the orphan source problem.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some of the sites with significant disused radioactive sources require specialized casks for safe transport and long-term storage of the sources. Funding is needed to pay for these casks and transportation expenses. At some sites, additional support is needed to characterize and package these sources in preparation for transport. • The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has trained and equipped teams to search additional facilities and secure vulnerable sources. To expand search efforts beyond the previously identified facilities, financial support for search and secure missions may be needed. This may include travel costs for Ukrainian search teams, administrative expenses for planning these missions, and financial support for characterization, packaging, and transportation of sources. • Both the IAEA and U.S. DOE have similar Search and Secure programs that could provide a mechanism or a partner for other potential donors to support these activities in Ukraine.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the initial stage of the project, known sites with high-activity radioactive sources cleaned out, and these sources removed to safe storage. • Search missions conducted at additional high-risk facilities and these materials secured. In the long-term, all significant sources identified and placed under regulatory control or removed to a secure disposal facility. • Search missions conducted regularly and integrated into the regulatory infrastructure.
Project Status	The United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, and Germany are contributing to this project. Additional donors will likely be needed to clean out facilities with high-activity disused sources and support search and secure efforts.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #6. Assistance Developing New Radioactive Source Disposal Facilities

Project Purpose	Improve Ukraine’s radioactive source disposal capacity so that all disused radioactive sources can be removed to a secure location where they cannot be trafficked.
Ukrainian Recipient	Ministry of Emergency Situations, Radons
Need	Some of the “Radon” storage facilities for disused radioactive sources are reaching capacity, and Ukraine lacks the resources to replace or appropriately expand these facilities on its own. This limited disposal capacity constrains Ukraine’s ability to secure orphaned sources and to seek out and secure disused sources. Ukraine plans to build one large radioactive source disposal facility within the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone to address all its long-term storage needs, but it also may need to expand capacity at existing facilities to meet short-term radioactive source disposal needs.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fund a limited expansion of capacity at existing Radons to address short-term capacity needs in those regions with the greatest immediate need. • Fund design and construction of a new long-term storage facility. • Provide needed equipment and support for consolidating radioactive sources into the new long-term storage facility.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan developed to use existing capacity more efficiently in the interim. • New storage facility built to meet long-term source disposal needs. • Sources consolidated into an appropriate long-term storage facility.
Project Status	The U.S. Department of Energy is providing assistance to expand capacity at the Radons to address short-term needs. The United Kingdom and European Union are funding the construction of the new long-term storage facility. The United States, France, Germany, Finland, and Sweden are funding the consolidation and transportation of sources into the new facility, but additional donors may be needed to support these costs.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #7. Improving Detection Capability at Seaports**

Project Purpose	To improve the ability of the SBGS and SCSU to detect any unauthorized possession or shipment of nuclear and radioactive materials at seaports and to seize those materials.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) and State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCSU)
Need	Equipment and training at specific Ukrainian seaports, to be mutually identified. A representative list of specific equipment to be provided to each seaport is provided in the Project Activities section. Officials from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Ukrainian government are currently discussing priority sites for this assistance. U.S. DOE has expressed willingness to work with interested donors and the Ukrainian government to collectively determine what equipment is needed at which sites.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the following equipment for each seaport: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Portal monitors, related communications equipment, and central alarm stations ○ Handheld radiation detectors ○ Barrett radios ○ CT-30 inspection kits • Provide funds for training SBGS and SCSU personnel to learn how to properly use the equipment, if they are not already proficient from indigenous or USG training on similar equipment. • Coordinate with ongoing U.S. assistance programs to ensure equipment is up to international standards and compatible with existing communication links.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate and sustained expanded capacity of the SBGS and SCSU to detect illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods. • Updated and improved equipment for the SBGS and SCSU to protect against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.
Project Status	The Republic of Korea has provided funding to equip a port along Ukraine’s Izmail River. U.S. DOE and Canada plan to offer assistance for two or more seaports, but additional donors will be needed.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #8. Improving Detection Capability at the Belarusian Border**

Project Purpose	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials at vehicle and rail crossings along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) and State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCSU)
Need	Equipment and training at specific vehicle and rail border crossings on the Belarusian border, to be mutually identified. A representative list of specific equipment to be provided at each crossing is provided in the Project Activities section. Officials from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Ukrainian government are currently discussing priority sites for this assistance. U.S. DOE has expressed willingness to work with interested donors and the Ukrainian government to collectively determine what equipment is needed at which sites.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the following equipment and financial support for each rail and vehicle crossing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Portal monitors, related communications equipment, and central alarm stations ○ Handheld radiation detectors ○ Barrett radios ○ CT-30 inspection kits • Provide funds for training SBGS and SCSU personnel to learn how to properly use the equipment, if they are not already proficient from indigenous or USG training on similar equipment. • Coordinate with ongoing assistance programs from the United States and other donors to ensure equipment is in accordance with international standards and compatible with existing communication links.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate and sustained expanded capacity of the SBGS and SCSU to detect illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods. • Updated and improved equipment for the SBGS and SCSU to protect against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.
Project Status	The United States, Canada, the IAEA, and the European Union have provided funding for equipment along the Belarusian border, but additional donors are needed.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #9. Improving Detection Capability at the Russian Border

Project Purpose	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials at vehicle and rail crossings along the Ukrainian-Russian border.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) and State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCSU)
Need	Equipment and training at specific vehicle and rail border crossings on the Russian border, to be mutually identified. A representative list of specific equipment to be provided at each crossing is provided in the Project Activities section. Officials from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Ukrainian government are currently discussing priority sites for this assistance. U.S. DOE has expressed willingness to work with interested donors and the Ukrainian government to collectively determine what equipment is needed at which sites.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the following equipment for each rail and vehicle crossing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Portal monitors, related communications equipment, and central alarm stations ○ Handheld radiation detectors ○ Barrett radios ○ CT-30 inspection kits • Provide funds for training SBGS and SCSU personnel to learn how to properly use the equipment, if they are not already proficient from indigenous or USG training on similar equipment. • Coordinate with ongoing assistance programs from the United States and other donors to ensure equipment is in accordance with international standards and compatible with existing communication links.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate and sustained expanded capacity of the SBGS and SCSU to detect illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods. • Updated and improved equipment for the SBGS and SCSU to protect against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.
Project Status	The United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea are providing financial assistance for this effort, but additional donors will be needed.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #10. Improving Security at Green Borders**

Project Purpose	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials along green borders.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS)
Need	Green borders are land borders that lie between official border crossing points. Many areas between established points of entry have little or no security, which presents a significant vulnerability that could be exploited by smugglers. Border guard patrols are usually the only means to detect any illicit trafficking. Additional vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, portable radiation detection equipment, and training would help border guards better patrol these areas to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the following equipment to the SBGS to be used to increase detection and interdiction capability along green borders: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Vehicles ○ Radios ○ Handheld radiation detectors ○ Night vision devices and thermal imaging equipment • Provide funds for training SBGS personnel to learn how to properly use the equipment where needed. • Coordinate with ongoing assistance programs from the United States to ensure equipment is compatible with existing communication links.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate and sustained expanded capacity of the SBGS to detect and interdict illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods along green borders. • Updated and improved equipment for the SBGS to protect against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.
Project Status	The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is providing assistance along the Moldovan border, Canada provided assistance along part of the Belarusian border, and the U.S. State Department is providing assistance along part of the Russian border. Additional donors will be needed for other border areas.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #11. Improving Maritime Security and Interdiction Capability

Project Purpose	To improve Ukraine’s maritime interdiction and detection capabilities in the Black Sea and reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS)
Need	Ukraine’s exclusive maritime economic zone in the Black Sea is a vast expanse with relatively little security, which presents a significant vulnerability that could be exploited by smugglers. Additional detection equipment and communication equipment would help improve the border guards’ interdiction and detection capabilities in the Black Sea to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide detection equipment to the SBGS to be used to increase detection and interdiction capabilities in the Black Sea. Provide funds for training SBGS personnel to learn how to properly use the equipment. • Coordinate with ongoing assistance programs from the United States to ensure equipment is up to international standards and compatible with existing communication links.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate and sustained expanded capacity of the SBGS to detect and interdict illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods in Ukraine’s exclusive maritime economic zone in the Black Sea. • Updated and improved equipment for the SBGS’s maritime and air units to protect against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.
Project Status	Project is funded by the United States and Sweden.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #12. Legal Assistance to Improve Prosecution of Nuclear Smuggling

Project Purpose	To ensure all types of nuclear smuggling cases can be adequately prosecuted.
Ukrainian Recipient	Working group established between the Rada and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU)
Need	Effective prosecution of criminals involved in illicit trafficking is vital to deter what is primarily an opportunistic, profit-driven crime. Ukraine has been unable to prosecute several cases where a smuggler tried to sell an empty container or other non-radioactive materials, claiming to have weapons-usable nuclear material. These nuclear smuggling scams constitute a significant portion of the cases of illicit trafficking in Ukraine, waste the valuable time of law enforcement and intelligence personnel, and may expose vulnerabilities that could be exploited by smugglers trafficking in more dangerous materials. These cases perpetuate the belief that smuggling nuclear and radioactive materials can be very profitable and may encourage additional thefts of these materials.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In March 2008, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) co-hosted a conference in Kyiv that helped Ukraine review its laws and made several recommendations to strengthen its ability to prosecute all cases of nuclear smuggling. • In September 2008, the Ukrainian government submitted proposed revisions to its criminal code for consideration to the Rada (parliament). • Pending approval by the Rada, the proposed revisions will be passed into law.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing laws regarding smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials strengthened. • Legal authorities created to prosecute scam cases that do not involve radioactive materials. • Awareness of the issue of illicit trafficking raised among legislators, prosecutors, and judges. • Number of convictions and/or jail time for smuggling offenses increased.
Project Status	Funded by the United States and UNODC. No additional donors are needed.

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, staffordmi@state.gov, 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #13. Improving Nuclear Forensics Capabilities

Project Purpose	To improve Ukraine’s nuclear forensics capabilities by increasing its participation in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG).
Ukrainian Recipient	National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU) and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU)
Need	Participation in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) would help Ukrainian scientists and law enforcement officials develop relationships with the international nuclear forensics community and increase their nuclear forensic and attribution knowledge and capabilities, which is particularly useful when examining seized material of unknown origin. Wider participation also increases the international knowledge base, which plays a critical factor in attribution during forensics testing of seized material.
Project Activities	A potential donor could sponsor travel and associated expenses for a Ukrainian scientist and a law enforcement representative to attend the annual ITWG meeting.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanded nuclear forensics capabilities of Ukraine’s scientific community. • Improved cooperation between Ukraine’s technical experts and its law enforcement community. • Improved contacts and cooperation between Ukrainian scientists and other scientists in the international nuclear forensics community. • Improved contacts and cooperation between the Ukrainian law enforcement community and their international counterparts. • Closer adherence to the international best practices on nuclear forensics reflected in the IAEA Nuclear Forensics Support Reference Manual (2006).
Project Status	Project funded by the United States and Sweden.

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, staffordmi@state.gov, 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #14. Anti-Corruption Training and Development for the SCSU and the SBGS

Project Purpose	To decrease the influence of corruption on the SCSU and SBGS and its effects on nonproliferation assistance programs.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCSU) and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS)
Need	Despite considerable recent improvements, corruption in Ukraine remains a serious problem and could undermine Ukrainian and international efforts to improve capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise procedures at border points to improve transparency and eliminate the opportunities for corruption. • Strengthen monitoring and enforcement of ethical and administrative standards. • Provide anti-corruption training for SCSU and SBGS personnel. • Incorporate such training into the curriculum for all SCSU and SBGS personnel.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey evidence showing a reduced number of users who made unofficial payments at border crossings. • Increased and consistent levels of aggregate customs revenues (as a proxy measure of professionalism and integrity). • Decreased influence of corruption reflected in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index and global corruption report.
Project Status	The United States and European Union are providing assistance to computerize customs processing, improve transparency of border procedures, adopt EU standards, develop standardized risk analysis models to target cargo searches, create an internal investigative unit within the SBGS, establish a Policy Excellence Center to make ongoing recommendations for reducing opportunities for corruption, and implement ethics training. There may be opportunities for additional donors to contribute to anti-corruption projects for the SCSU and SBGS.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #15. Anti-Corruption Training and Development for Ukrainian State Authorities
Responsible for Protecting Nuclear Materials

Project Purpose	To reduce the level of corruption in the Ukrainian state authorities involved in countering the threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
Ukrainian Recipient	Various agencies
Need	Despite considerable recent improvements, corruption in Ukraine remains a serious problem. Corruption in agencies responsible for physical protection of nuclear or radioactive materials presents the risk that a well-connected insider could divert dangerous materials. This corruption is particularly worrisome because it could undermine Ukrainian and international efforts to improve the security of these materials. A comprehensive approach to combating corruption in various Ukrainian ministries and agencies is needed to reduce the risk that corruption could undermine Ukraine’s efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop recommendations for Ukrainian state authorities on the methods for reducing corruption. • Develop a code of conduct for inspectors responsible for safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. • Improve monitoring and enforcement of anti-corruption standards. • Develop new training modules for these inspectors aimed at maintaining high moral and ethical standards. • Review relevant procedures to eliminate opportunities for corruption.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professional atmosphere with no tolerance for corruption. • New anti-corruption training modules aimed at maintaining high moral and ethical standards. • Decreased influence of corruption reflected in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index and global corruption report.
Project Status	The U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation provided nearly \$45 million to support Ukrainian anti-corruption efforts by strengthening civil society’s ability to monitor and expose corruption, reforming the judicial system, drafting ethics codes for the executive branch, increasing government monitoring and enforcement of ethical and administrative standards, improving the system of asset and income declaration for public servants, streamlining and enforcing regulations, combating corruption in higher education, and establishing a Policy Excellence Center to make ongoing recommendations for reducing opportunities for corruption. Additional assistance is needed to continue these efforts.

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, staffordmi@state.gov, 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #16. Equipment and Procedures for Identification of Nuclear Material in Bulk-
Form by Means of Destructive (Nuclear and Chemical) Analysis at the NSC KIPT**

Project Purpose	To obtain accurate and comprehensive measurement data concerning properties, characteristics, and isotopic content of nuclear material compounds in bulk-form that are located at NSC KIPT.
Ukrainian Recipient	National Scientific Center “Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology” (NSC KIPT) of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU)
Need	NSC KIPT and the government of Ukraine are committed to protect the nuclear material at this facility to prevent it from being stolen and trafficked. A number of physical security upgrades have already been completed at this facility. As part of its ongoing efforts to improve security at NSC KIPT, new measurement equipment is needed to improve accountancy and safeguards at the facility.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish procedures for measurement and analysis of nuclear material, by means of nuclear and chemical destructive methods. • Provide up-to-date mass-spectrometry and electronic microscopy equipment, which would make it possible to conduct identification and re-packaging of nuclear materials according to accountancy system units.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Qualitative upgrading of the facility safeguards system. • Improved system of physical protection at NSC KIPT.
Project Status	Japan is planning to implement this project.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #17. Extension of the Service and Maintenance of the Perimeter Protection
System at NSC KIPT

Project Purpose	To guarantee the reliable operation of the existing perimeter protection system at the NSC KIPT for a prolonged period of time.
Ukrainian Recipient	National Scientific Center “Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology” (NSC KIPT) of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU)
Need	NSC KIPT and the government of Ukraine are committed to protecting the nuclear material at this facility to prevent it from being stolen and trafficked. A number of physical security upgrades have already been completed at this facility. Equipment for the perimeter protection system has been in place for more than five years, and some of the components require either replacement or renewal of their specifications. The whole system requires testing and inspection regarding its endurance and operating conditions. Replacement or specification renewal for selected components would allow the extension of the operational term of this system without engaging the considerable costs that a total and comprehensive upgrade would demand.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and inspect the whole perimeter protection system regarding its endurance and operating conditions. • Replace components or renew specifications as needed.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extend the operational term of the perimeter protection system without the considerable costs of a comprehensive upgrade. • Guarantee the reliable operation of the existing perimeter protection system at the NSC KIPT for a prolonged period of time.
Project Status	Japan and Sweden are planning to implement this project.

**Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #18. Improving Detection Capability at Boryspol International Airport**

Project Purpose	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials through Boryspol International Airport in Kyiv.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS)
Need	The Boryspol International Airport in Kyiv will expand significantly over the next two years and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Second Line of Defense (SLD) program identified a need for approximately 40 additional radiation portal monitors at four new terminals and one additional checkpoint. The total cost of equipping the airport with 40 monitors would be approximately \$8 million, but a potential donor could fund a portion of this need with a smaller contribution.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the following equipment for each airport terminal POE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Portal monitors, related communications equipment, and central alarm stations ○ Handheld radiation detectors • Provide financial support for construction of the new airport terminal POEs and new checkpoint. • Provide funds for training SBGS personnel to learn how to properly use the equipment, if they are not already proficient from indigenous or USG training on similar equipment. • Coordinate with ongoing assistance programs from SLD and the United States to ensure equipment is from the same manufacturer (Aspect) and compatible with existing communication links.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate and sustained expanded capacity of the SBGS to detect illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods. • Updated and improved equipment for the SBGS to protect against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.
Project Status	New Zealand has contributed funds to supply radiological monitoring equipment at the cargo warehouse of Boryspol International Airport. The United States and Canada have provided funding for portal monitors at the airport's old terminals. SLD is currently conducting engineering surveys at the airport's new terminals and new checkpoint. Additional donors are needed.

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, staffordmi@state.gov, 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #19. Improving Detection Capability at the Western Border

Project Purpose	To reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials at vehicle and rail crossings along Ukraine’s western border.
Ukrainian Recipient	State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) and State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCSU)
Need	Equipment and training at specific vehicle and rail border crossings on the western border, to be mutually identified. A representative list of specific equipment to be provided at each crossing is provided in the Project Activities section. Officials from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Ukrainian government are currently discussing priority sites for this assistance. U.S. DOE has expressed willingness to work with interested donors and the Ukrainian government to collectively determine what equipment is needed at which sites.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the following equipment for each rail and vehicle crossing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Portal monitors, related communications equipment, and central alarm stations ○ Handheld radiation detectors ○ Barrett radios ○ CT-30 inspection kits • Provide funds for training SBGS and SCSU personnel to learn how to properly use the equipment, if they are not already proficient from indigenous or U.S. Government training on similar equipment. • Coordinate with ongoing assistance programs from the United States and other donors to ensure equipment is up to international standards and compatible with existing communication links.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate and sustained expanded capacity of the SBGS and SCSU to detect illegally trafficked nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods. • Updated and improved equipment for the SBGS and SCSU to protect against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and other contraband goods.
Project Status	The United States, European Union, and Canada are providing financial assistance for this project, but additional donors will be needed.

For questions, contact Michael Stafford, U.S. Department of State, staffordmi@state.gov, 202-647-0258, or go to: <http://www.nsoi-state.net>.

Priority Assistance Project to Help Ukraine Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Project #20. Security of Radioactive Sources at Izotop

Project Purpose	To improve security of radioactive sources located at Izotop
Ukrainian Recipient	Ukrainian State Industrial Enterprise “Izotop” and Ministry of Industrial Policy of Ukraine
Need	In addition to possessing a large number of high-activity radioactive sources, the State Enterprise Izotop has a significant role in the import/export of radioactive sources in Ukraine. Izotop needs to ensure adequate physical protection for these sources, and it also needs a hot cell to repack high-activity radioactive sources on-site without exposing its personnel to dangerous levels of radiation. Currently, sources in need of repackaging are sent to a hot cell in Kyiv, which increases the vulnerability of these sources during transit.
Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve physical security of the radioactive sources at the Izotop facility. This includes improvement of the facility perimeter and a new local perimeter around the storage building. • Install a hot cell at Izotop to consolidate repackaging operations outside of Kyiv.
Project Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security of radioactive sources at Izotop meets or exceeds international standards. • Hot cell at Izotop minimizes transportation of sources
Project Status	Project funded by Germany.